What’s in Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum? – The Diplomat

On June 5, Kazakhs will vote on a package deal of reforms supposed to rework the country from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a robust parliament.”

Six months after Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called protesters terrorists and requested assist from the Russian-backed Collective Safety Treaty Group to quell mass unrest, residents will take part in a referendum on constitutional reforms. 

The vote will happen on June 5, just one month after the proposed reforms had been launched. The reform package addresses 33 separate articles – about one third of the full constitutional articles – and was developed by a working group that Tokayev established in March. The reforms are said to rework Kazakhstan from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a robust parliament,” per Tokayev’s state of the union handle on March 16.

A brilliant-presidential system is one the place parliaments and courts are solely nominally impartial, and the president and their administration have almost limitless control over political decision-making. Kazakhstan’s first step to a super-presidential system was the adoption of a brand new constitution in 1995 that was pushed by Nursultan Nazarbayev after dissolving an uncooperative parliament. Nazarbayev further consolidated his personal powers with constitutional amendments in 1998, 2007, and 2011.

Nazarbayev began to loosen the president’s control with constitutional amendments in 2017 that barely redistributed presidential powers to different branches of presidency and opened the path for the election of local representatives, at least at the village degree. Nevertheless, Nazarbayev slyly maintained his personal control over Kazakhstan’s politics by including provisions that protected him as “elbasy,” or chief of the nation.

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The proposed constitutional reforms strip the constitution of mentions of elbasy and the First President of the Republic, which some see as a continued signal of the Nazarbayev family’s fall from grace. 

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In addition to sidelining Nazarbayev, several proposed provisions would slightly prohibit the power of the president. The president shouldn't be a member of a political party, which member of the working group Sara Idrysheva known as “the bravest step of our esteemed president.” In anticipation of this modification, Tokayev stepped down as chairman of the Amanat party – a rebranded version of Nazarbayev’s ruling Nur Otan celebration – on April 26. Moreover, the president can now not override the acts of akims of oblasts, main cities, or the capital and shut relations of the president can not hold political posts.

A number of proposed measures give parliament extra energy vis-a-vis the president. Kazakhstan’s parliament will remain bicameral, however the distribution of power between the upper and decrease homes will shift somewhat. The Senate will not have the power to make new laws, and as an alternative will simply approve or reject laws handed by the Mazhilis. Moreover, the process for selecting deputies to both homes will change. 

First, the Mazhilis will likely be reduced to 98 deputies, following the abolition of 9 seats appointed by the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. Those seats can be transferred to the Senate, and the Assembly of the Peoples will now solely get to nominate five deputies. The variety of deputies appointed by the president will probably be reduced from 15 to 10.

Second, Mazhilis deputies will be elected in accordance with a mixed system. Seventy percent of Mazhilis deputies shall be chosen by proportional elections, and 30 % can be straight elected.

The one proposed adjustments to the judicial system relate to the reestablishment of the Constitutional Court. Kazakhstan had a Constitutional Court until the adoption of the 1995 structure, which instituted a weaker constitutional council. The president nonetheless maintains a strong affect over the Constitutional Court docket’s makeup, however, with the ability to pick out the court’s chairman and 4 of the judges; parliament chooses the opposite three.

Tokayev has emphasised the importance of local governance, marked by the first-ever direct election of village akims and plans to introduce three new oblasts that may convey authorities bodies nearer to the populations they characterize. Perhaps probably the most disappointing aspect of proposed reforms is the shortage of significant motion on native representation for residents of Kazakhstan’s largest cities. If the referendum passes, Kazakhstanis will get to vote for akims of oblasts, major cities, and the capital – nevertheless, the candidates can have been selected by the president. The proper to elect native management has been one of the constant calls for from Almaty residents, and this attempt to create selection is finally beauty.

The proposed reforms are essential steps towards real consultant authorities in Kazakhstan; nevertheless, they do not necessarily constitute forward movement. Many of the amendments are merely reinstating mechanisms of checks on presidential power that beforehand existed, somewhat than materially changing the connection between state and society, as Tokayev claims.