What’s in Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum? – The Diplomat

On June 5, Kazakhs will vote on a package of reforms supposed to transform the country from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a strong parliament.”

Six months after Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev referred to as protesters terrorists and requested support from the Russian-backed Collective Safety Treaty Organization to quell mass unrest, residents will take part in a referendum on constitutional reforms. 

The vote will take place on June 5, only one month after the proposed reforms had been launched. The reform package addresses 33 separate articles – about one third of the entire constitutional articles – and was developed by a working group that Tokayev established in March. The reforms are said to transform Kazakhstan from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a robust parliament,” per Tokayev’s state of the union address on March 16.

A super-presidential system is one where parliaments and courts are solely nominally impartial, and the president and their administration have practically unlimited management over political decision-making. Kazakhstan’s first step to a super-presidential system was the adoption of a new constitution in 1995 that was pushed by Nursultan Nazarbayev after dissolving an uncooperative parliament. Nazarbayev further consolidated his private powers with constitutional amendments in 1998, 2007, and 2011.

Nazarbayev began to loosen the president’s control with constitutional amendments in 2017 that barely redistributed presidential powers to different branches of government and opened the trail for the election of local representatives, at the very least at the village stage. Nonetheless, Nazarbayev slyly maintained his personal management over Kazakhstan’s politics by together with provisions that protected him as “elbasy,” or chief of the nation.

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The proposed constitutional reforms strip the constitution of mentions of elbasy and the First President of the Republic, which some see as a continued sign of the Nazarbayev family’s fall from grace. 

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In addition to sidelining Nazarbayev, a number of proposed provisions would slightly limit the ability of the president. The president should not be a member of a political party, which member of the working group Sara Idrysheva called “the bravest step of our esteemed president.” In anticipation of this modification, Tokayev stepped down as chairman of the Amanat occasion – a rebranded model of Nazarbayev’s ruling Nur Otan get together – on April 26. Moreover, the president can no longer override the acts of akims of oblasts, major cities, or the capital and close relations of the president can not hold political posts.

A number of proposed measures give parliament extra energy vis-a-vis the president. Kazakhstan’s parliament will stay bicameral, but the distribution of power between the higher and decrease houses will shift considerably. The Senate will not have the facility to make new laws, and instead will simply approve or reject laws handed by the Mazhilis. Moreover, the method for selecting deputies to both houses will change. 

First, the Mazhilis might be lowered to 98 deputies, following the abolition of 9 seats appointed by the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. These seats will be transferred to the Senate, and the Meeting of the Peoples will now only get to appoint five deputies. The variety of deputies appointed by the president shall be diminished from 15 to 10.

Second, Mazhilis deputies will likely be elected according to a mixed system. Seventy % of Mazhilis deputies shall be chosen by proportional elections, and 30 % can be immediately elected.

The one proposed changes to the judicial system relate to the reestablishment of the Constitutional Court docket. Kazakhstan had a Constitutional Court docket until the adoption of the 1995 structure, which instituted a weaker constitutional council. The president still maintains a powerful affect over the Constitutional Court’s make-up, nonetheless, with the flexibility to pick the court’s chairman and 4 of the judges; parliament chooses the other three.

Tokayev has emphasised the importance of local governance, marked by the first-ever direct election of village akims and plans to introduce three new oblasts that will deliver authorities our bodies closer to the populations they represent. Maybe probably the most disappointing aspect of proposed reforms is the shortage of significant movement on local illustration for residents of Kazakhstan’s largest cities. If the referendum passes, Kazakhstanis will get to vote for akims of oblasts, main cities, and the capital – however, the candidates can have been selected by the president. The precise to elect native management has been probably the most consistent demands from Almaty residents, and this try to create choice is ultimately beauty.

The proposed reforms are essential steps toward real representative authorities in Kazakhstan; nevertheless, they don't necessarily represent forward motion. Most of the amendments are merely reinstating mechanisms of checks on presidential energy that beforehand existed, quite than materially changing the relationship between state and society, as Tokayev claims.